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COMMENT
Let's Get Together: An Analysis of the
Applicability of the Rules of
Professional Conduct to Collaborative
Law
I. INTRODUCTION
"Collaborative law" is a relatively recent phenomenon in the panoply of the
legal world. Its birth traces back to Minneapolis in 1990.1 Since that time, it has
expanded fairly rapidly; collaborative law groups can now be found across the
country.2 Driven by promises that it reduces costs terms of in time, money, and
personal acrimony, collaborative law has its ardent proponents, yet it also has
raised questions concerning different aspects of its implementation.3 Given the
practice's growth in the last fifteen years and the stir it has created amongst com-
mentators and practitioners, collaborative law deserves careful study. Describing
the intricacies of the practice is beyond the scope of this comment, but a brief
synopsis of the central features of the standard collaborative law arrangement will
be provided to establish a foundation for the ultimate aim of the comment, which
is to illuminate the interaction of the practice and various ethical issues.
It is the purpose of this comment to explore some of the major areas in which
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct and a typical collaborative law arrange-
ment may intersect, and to discuss the differences of opinion among the few state
ethics committees that have commented on collaborative law. A deeper under-
standing of the relationship between the collaborative lawyer, the legal system,
and society at large should help to foster greater awareness of the duties and re-
sponsibilities inherent in lawyer-client relationships created under the collabora-
tive rubric.
1. JULIE MACFARLANE, THE EMERGING PHENOMENON OF COLLABORATIVE FAMILY LAW (CFL): A
QUALITATIVE STUDY OF CFL CASES 4 (2005).
2. Id. at 3-4.
3. See id. at 4, 6; John Lande, Possibilities for Collaborative Law: Ethics and Practice of Lawyer
Disqualification and Process Control in a New Model of Lawyering, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1315, 1325-29,
1340 (2003).
1
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HI. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
A. Introduction to Collaborative Law and the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct
Collaborative law began as a reaction to what some saw as inadequacies and
shortfalls of the traditional adversarial framework, both as a critique of litigation's
inexact fit within the specialty area of family law, and as a generalized response to
the core values of the traditional model.4 The move away from litigation and
towards the collaborative model was also motivated by a feeling that the attor-
ney's traditional role was ill-suited for handling divorce. 5 Proponents of the col-
laborative model were discouraged by bitter prior experiences with client-spouses
and their children, which were said to be caused by the inherent pressures of ad-
versarial litigation. Critics of the traditional model included many lawyers who
felt that the adversarial model fundamentally did not reflect their individual val-
ues. These lawyers perceived that litigation simplistically attempted to quantify
complex life issues into dollars and that it artificially created a hyper-competitive
environment. These lawyers criticized the traditional system for requiring them to
subordinate their personal values to their professional duties.6 These frustrations,
coupled with a desire to create a greater degree of client satisfaction, led to efforts
to develop a new dispute resolution method to supplement, or even replace, tradi-
tional litigation.7 Rather than hesitate to negotiate at all or to negotiate position-
ally,8 as is the practice in much of the traditional legal world,9 collaborative law-
yers seek to frame negotiation with a cooperative spirit that starts at the beginning
of the matter and continues to its conclusion.
10
Collaborative law arrangements are governed by written sets of ground rules.
The parties and their lawyers sign a participation agreement that memorializes an
exclusive focus on negotiation, mandates disclosure of all relevant information,
and includes a "disqualification agreement" provision that stipulates that the law-
yers involved will only represent the parties in negotiation and will not represent
them in litigation. Either client (or both) may choose to withdraw from the
agreement and pursue litigation.' Collaborative practitioners believe that this
arrangement will create a paradigm shift for both the lawyer and the client, vis a
vis the traditional adversarial model or even other forms of ADR such as media-
tion. Since the threat of litigation is removed from the realm of possibility of the
collaborative lawyer and client, the parties should be free in four-way negotiations
to identify essential interests of each client, setting the tone for a more cooperative
4. See MACFARLANE, supra note 1, at 2, 17.
5. Id. at 17.
6. Id. at 17-18.
7. See id. at 2-5, 19-21; see also Lande, supra note 3, at 1317.
8. Positional negotiation is a form of negotiating that involves taking fixed positions and arguing
them to the other side, regardless of any underlying interests. Brad Spangler, Positional Bargaining
(June 2003), http://www.beyondintractability.orglessay/positional-bargainingl (last visited January 30,
2006).
9. See Lande, supra note 3, at 1317.
10. See id. at 1318-20; MACFARLANE, supra note 1, at 1-5.
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atmosphere and allowing for all involved to work towards the ideal of a positive
sum gain 12 for both parties.
13
As will be discussed infra, collaborative law deviates from the norms of the
traditional adversarial framework in several respects. 14 While the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (Model Rules) 15 are used as a framework for collaborative
law, the rules lack specific guidelines for collaborative law. As such, and because
few state courts and ethics committees have commented on the subject, 16 careful
consideration of collaborative law in light of prevailing ethical standards is impor-
tant for collaborative lawyers. As the Model Rules aptly state, "lawyers play a
vital role in the preservation of society, and fulfilling this role requires an under-
standing by lawyers of their relationship to [the] legal system. The [Model
Rules], when properly applied, serve to define that relationship.,' 17
B. Applying the Model Rules: Who is the Client?
The Model Rules do not provide a specific definition of "client," although in
applying the rules governing the lawyer-client relationship, determining who is
the client seems to be a necessary first step for determining the duties owed to him
or her. 1 A lawyer-client relationship gives rise to a host of rights and duties that
do not apply to a relationship between a lawyer and a third party. 19 In the collabo-
rative law context, contemplating the lawyer-client relationship is of special con-
cern in light of varying attitudes amongst collaborative law practitioners about
precisely whom they serve. Some collaborative law practitioners do not wish to
20cast themselves as an advocate for a particular side, while some see themselves
12. A positive sum relationship is a relationship between two entities which are, as a sum, better off
as a result of participating in that relationship. Therefore, to each participating party, a positive sum
gain is a gain greater than what could have been achieved had the party not participated in the relation-
ship. A zero sum relationship, by contrast, is where the outcome of the relationship is a gain for one
participant at the direct expense of the other. See Free Definition: Define Positive Sum Relationship.
What is Positive Sum Relationship?, http://www.learnthat.comdefine/view.asp.id=333 (last visited
February 26, 2006).
13. See James K.L. Lawrence, Collaborative Lawyering: A New Development in Conflict Resolu-
tion, 17 OHIO ST. J. ON DisP. RESOL. 431,433 (2002).
14. See Christopher M. Fairman, Ethics and Collaborative Lawyering: Why Put Old Hats on New
Heads?, 18 OHIO ST. J. ON DIsP. REsOL. 505, 522-23 (2003).
15. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT (2003). The term 'Model Rules' hereinafter refers to
the American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct. When appropriate, state devia-
tions from the Rules will be mentioned as well.
16. See Lande, supra note 3, at 1329.
17. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble [13] (2004). There is some debate amongst
commentators as to whether the Model Rules should apply to collaborative arrangements, in light of its
design being apparently based on an adversarial worldview of the law. See Fairman, supra note 14, at
521-28. The focus of this comment, rather than question the merits of whether the Model Rules should
apply to collaborative law, is to examine how it applies.
18. See Pa. Eth. Op., Informal Op. 2004-24, 2004 WL 2758094 at *3.
19. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.0-1.18 (2004).
20. MACFARLANE, supra note 1, at 10. In fact, one lawyer interviewed in the study, in response to a
question regarding challenges experienced as an advocate in a particular collaborative case, replied,
"Oh, I never saw myself as being [an] advocate. I was primarily [the client's], and [the other lawyer's]
and [the other client's], guide to their own capacity for having their internal behaviours be the right
behaviours, vis-A-vis one another. And so, no, I never advocated anything. I advocated people trying
to attain their best behaviours in a very unusual and time-compressed situation." Id.
No. 1]
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as representing both the client and the nuclear family.2' Though the two preceding
examples may be somewhat unrepresentative of the thoughts of the general popu-
lation of collaborative lawyers, they serve to illustrate the proposition that some
collaborative lawyers may not be fully representing their clients.
State authorities have commented on the idea that some collaborative lawyers
do not see themselves as fully representing their clients. For example, Pennsyl-
vania terms this type of collaborative lawyer a "lawyer for the situation." This
term is used to describe the lawyer who represents a client in part and another
interest in part (such as the client's family, or the integrity of the collaborative
structure). Pennsylvania law expressly forbids the idea of a non-advocate lawyer
in any context, including in the collaborative setting.22
Other states do not explicitly delineate this position in their ethics opinions.
23
For example, Kentucky endorses an opposite view of lawyers who hold them-
selves out as representing both the client and other interests. This opinion first
acknowledges the lawyer's role as an advisor, as a lawyer has the ability to advise
the client on various non-legal, but relevant considerations. The Kentucky opinion
further justifies a collaborative lawyer's duel representation by noting that, in
certain situations, a lawyer "represents" two clients with disparate interests by
acting as an intermediary. 24 Although practitioners in Model Rules jurisdictions
cannot rely on the opinion's latter "intermediary" justification, a lawyer using the
former "advisor" justification could conceivably argue that he or she is merely
keeping the client's non-legal yet still relevant concerns in mind, such as state of
mind or intrinsic happiness. The Kentucky opinion cites with approval one com-
mentator who says that a lawyer's consideration of other interests along with the
purely pecuniary, far from being a "lawyer for the situation," is performing due
diligence for the client:
Attorneys have an ethical obligation to competently and diligently repre-
sent the client. Collaborative family law does not change that. The col-
laborative family law process does necessitate consideration of the finan-
cial and emotional needs of both spouses, the children, and the family as
a whole in working toward settlement, but the collaborative lawyer is ex-
pected to represent his or her client with the same due diligence owed in
any proceeding. Due diligence includes considering with the client what
is in the client's best interests, which includes the well being of children,
family peace, and economic stability. If the collaborative family law
21. See Pa. Eth. Op., 2004 WL 2758094 at *3.
22. Id.
23. See, e.g., 2002 N.C. Eth. Op. 1, Formal Op. 2002 WL 2029469.
24. See Ky. Bar Ass'n Eth. Op. KBA E-425 at 4 (2005); see also MODEL RULES OF PROF'L
CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2004). But see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT Preamble [2] (2004) (a lawyer
in an advisory capacity "provides a client with an informed understanding of the client's legal rights
and obligations and explains their practical implications."). Further, note that unlike KY. SUP. CT. R.
3.130(2.2), which provides that the lawyer may act as an intermediary between clients assuming cer-
tain conditions are met, there is no equivalent in the Model Rules - the provision governing this cir-
cumstance has been deleted. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.2 (2004). However, a lawyer
may under the Model Rules act as a third-party neutral, so if the parties involved were no longer char-
acterized as the lawyer's clients, this scenario would comport with the Rules, assuming other ethical
responsibilities were met. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.4 (2004).
[Vol. 2007
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process is not in the client's best interests, the attorney is charged to ad-
vise the client to choose a different system, tailored to his or her needs.
25
Although considering all relevant criteria is important in representing a client
and is indeed a part of due diligence, it does not adequately justify situations
where the collaborative lawyer's other interest is the integrity of the collaborative
process. In such a case, it is difficult to categorize the lawyer's commitment to a
set of procedures as being part of the client's non-legal interests, so due diligence
alone cannot adequately explain or justify the collaborative lawyer representing
interests other than those of his or her client.
C. Applying the Model Rules: Conflicts of Interest
At one level, applicability of the ethical rules when representing multiple cli-
ents depends at least in part on how the collaborative arrangement is classified.
For example, a collaborative arrangement in the family law setting, formed with
the objective of protecting the interests of both spouses, raises the question of how
the arrangement should be classified. The Pennsylvania opinion indicates a con-
cern that some collaborative lawyers could be interpreting the collaborative proc-
26ess as one where the lawyer represents the interests of both spouses. If this was
the case, Rule 1.7, which addresses conflicts of interest amongst current clients,
27
would need to be applied to the situation to determine compliance. 28 On the other
hand, if the consideration of the other spouse's interests (or the interests of the
family as a whole) is not considered to be representation of a second client, but
rather, valid considerations relevant to the lawyer's advisory capacity to the first
client, these rules would arguably not need to be applied.29  Resolution of this
question appears to be factual in nature. Norms within collaborative law are in an
emerging stage,30 and this includes practitioner attitudes about precisely which
interests the lawyer considers himself or herself to represent. 3' The Pennsylvania
opinion takes a position at one end of the spectrum of the state ethics opinions that
have addressed collaborative law in terms of the ethical concerns in representing
25. Sheila M. Gutterman, Collaborative Family Law-Part I1, COLO. LAW., Dec. 2001, at 57.
26. See Pa Eth. Op. 2004-24, 2004 WL 2758094 at *4.
27. MODEL RuLEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2004).
(a) Except as provided in paragraph (b), a lawyer shall not represent a client if the representation
involves a concurrent conflict of interest. A concurrent conflict of interest exists if: (1) the repre-
sentation of one client will be directly adverse to another client; or (2) there is a significant risk
that the representation of one or more clients will be materially limited by the lawyer's responsi-
bilities to another client, a former client or a third person or by a personal interest of the lawyer.
(b) Notwithstanding the existence of a concurrent conflict of interest under paragraph (a), a law-
yer may represent a client if: (1) the lawyer reasonably believes that the lawyer will be able to
provide competent and diligent representation to each affected client; (2) the representation is not
prohibited by law; (3) the representation does not involve the assertion of a claim by one client
against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding before
a tribunal; and (4) each affected client gives informed consent, confirmed in writing.
Id.
28. See Pa. Eth. Op., 2004 WL 2758094 at *4.
29. See Ky. Eth. Op. at 4.
30. See MACFARLANE, supra note 1, at 12.
31. See id. at 8-11.
No. 1]
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multiple clients. The opinion acknowledges that Rule 1.7 requires consideration
of what the lawyer's intentions are, but does not create a per se rule that collabora-
tive arrangements necessarily have a multiple client conflict of interest.
32
On the opposite end of the spectrum is the Kentucky opinion, which does not
appear to contemplate the conflicts of interest issue. The Kentucky opinion would
likely classify a lawyer's consideration of both spouse's interests, or a lawyer's
decision to not advocate a particular position in support of the collaborative proc-
ess, as within the lawyer's advisory function and thus must not advocate a particu-
lar position or course of action.33 However, according to Rule 2.1, a lawyer is
primarily a legal advisor, not a moral advisor. 34 The intent of Rule 2.1 seems to be
at least a partial attempt to acknowledge a common dynamic within the lawyer-
client relationship-that non-legal considerations such as morals and the client's
familial relationships are sometimes inextricably linked with the legal questions
facing the client.35  Additionally, part of the intent behind the rule is that it is
designed to maximize the lawyer's ability to communicate effectively with clients
who may not always expect advice in purely technical legal terms.
36
In short, although Rule 1.7 does not explicitly preclude a lawyer from at-
tempting to advise the client about relevant concerns regarding the client's spouse
or family, it makes a point to note that there are certain matters that are beyond the
scope of the legal profession and may be more appropriately handled by a differ-
ent professional.37 Therefore, Rule 2.1 does not seem to be a completely satisfac-
tory explanation in regards to precluding the applicability of Rule 1.7. Rule 2.1
does not obviate the duty of loyalty inherent in Rule 1.7. Further, Rule 2.1 seems
to be intended as a truism, codifying that which lawyers already know and do.
A collaborative lawyer who "doesn't advocate" for a particular side, or one
who does not fully represent his or her client, should thus analyze the relationship
under Rule 1.7.8 Under this rule, a concurrent conflict of interest exists between
clients in two situations: (1) where there are directly adverse interests of clients;39
and (2) where there is a significant risk that representing a client will be materiallz
limited by the lawyer's responsibilities to another person or a personal interest.
Notwithstanding a concurrent conflict of interest, representation may generally
proceed in the collaborative context if two 41 conditions are met: (1) the lawyer
32. See Pa. Eth. Op., 2004 WL 2758094 at *3.
33. See MACFARLANE, supra note 1, at 10; Ky. Eth. Op. at 4.
34. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 2.1 cmt. [2] (2004).
35. See id.
36. See id. cmt. [3].
37. See id. cmt. [4].
38. As stated above, Rule 1.7 is conceivably not universally applicable in all collaborative law
situations, at least with respect to the multiple clients question (though it should still be kept in mind
with regard to concurrent conflicts of interest between a lawyer's representation of a client and a third
party or the lawyer's own interests). In the same study by Dr. Macfarlane, another lawyer replied:
I absolutely think I have a special responsibility to my client. I mean, I am their attorney. I am
her attorney or his attorney and there is no question in my mind that that is my primary duty. I
mean, that's what my job is, that's what I'm being retained for, and if that's not the case, there
can be a mediation with two mediators who are neutrals.
MACFARLANE, supra note 1, at 8.
39. MODEL RULE OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(1) (2004).
40. R. 1.7(a)(2).
41. There are generally four conditions that must be met, however two of these (that the representa-
tion not otherwise be prohibited by law and that the representation not involve the assertion of a claim
[Vol. 2007
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reasonably believes he or she can provide competent and diligent representation to
each affected client; and (2) each affected client gives written informed consent.42
It is probable that a lawyer representing two spouses could have a conflict of
interest, either because the interests of the two spouses are directly adverse or
because representing one spouse will be materially limited by the representation
of the other spouse. Although the provision regulating directly adverse interests is
most commonly associated with litigation, the comments to Rule 1.7 make it clear
that directly adverse conflicts can arise in other contexts as well.43 Hence, it is
possible that some collaborative arrangements could involve directly adverse in-
terests. In the specific example mentioned above, not advocating any position
does not appear to rise to the level of a directly adverse conflict, as a directly ad-
verse conflict from the lawyer's vantage point would not seem to arise until the
lawyer advocated for each client."a The collaborative arrangement could have a
greater chance of running afoul of the conflicts of interest rules because there may
be a significant risk that representation of one client will be materially limited by
another client, third party, or personal interest of the lawyer. A conflict of this
sort effectively cuts off alternatives that would otherwise be available to the client
in a more traditional legal setting. The pertinent factors to consider in determining
a conflict of this type are (1) the degree of likelihood that a difference in interests
will eventuate, and (2) if it does, whether it will materially interfere with the law-
yer's independent professional judgment in considering alternatives or will fore-
close courses of action that reasonably should be pursued on behalf of the client.45
A lawyer hired to represent one client but who nonetheless does not advocate for
either side arguably has placed a material limitation on the representation of his or
her client, not necessarily by the relationship to the other spouse, the children, or
the family as a whole, 46 but by the lawyer's personal interest in functioning in an
alternate definition of "lawyer.' 47  Other collaborative lawyers may approach
representation with the goal of promoting the integrity of the collaborative process
over any other consideration,4 8 which is arguably also a personal interest that ma-
terially limits representation of the client.
by one client against another client represented by the lawyer in the same litigation or other proceeding
before a tribunal) are unlikely to apply to collaborative law arrangements and thus are not discussed.
See MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2004).
42. Id. Kentucky's applicable rule is substantively the same as the Model Rule with one notable
exception - informed consent need not be written, although an attorney wishing to represent two cli-
ents in a single transaction must explain the implications of the representation, including the risks and
advantages it entails. See Ky. SUP. CT. R. 3.130(1.7) (1990).
43. For example, the comments acknowledge that directly adverse conflicts can also arise in the
transactional context. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 cmt. [7] (2004).
44. See also id. at cmt. [6].
45. Id. at cmt. [8].
46. Although "representing" a somewhat nebulous entity such as the family is arguably neither a
second client nor a third party, Pennsylvania suggests that the family could conceivably be regarded as
a client and thus subject to Rule 1.7, although it acknowledges the difficulties inherent in classifying it
as such. See Pa. Eth. Op supra note 18, at 5.
47. See MACFARLANE, supra note 1, at 9. Some of the collaborative practitioners interviewed in Dr.
Macfarlane's study prided themselves on functioning more as a friend and healer than as an attorney.
Id.
48. See MACFARLANE, supra note 1, at 11. This view can be illustrated in the words of one lawyer
who was interviewed by Dr. Macfarlane, who said "I don't really care about whether the outcome is
No. 1]
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D. Applying the Model Rules: Competent Representation, Informed Con-
sent, and Agreements Limiting the Scope of Representation
The conflicts of interest in Rule 1.7 that could occur in some collaborative
law arrangements can be obviated if the conditions in Rule 1.7(b) are met.49 If the
lawyer holds a reasonable belief that he or she can provide competent and diligent
representation to the client(s), and if the client(s) give informed consent, then even
arrangements in which the lawyer represents both spouses or has a ersonal inter-
est that limits full representation of the client may be permissible. 5U Meeting the
objective standard of competence and diligence necessarily depends on what the
parameters of the representation are.5' For example, a lawyer whose representa-
tion is undertaken for the purpose of conducting a complex anti-trust action will
have a different standard than a lawyer who is retained for the purpose of render-
ing an opinion on a simple contract.52 In the collaborative law context, compe-
tence and diligence will be determined at least in part by what the scope of repre-
sentation is. The Model Rules provide the lawyer with the ability to limit the
scope of the representation; 53 however, the restriction must be reasonable and may
be put in place only with the client's informed consent.54 Further, the comments
to Rule 1.7 imply that the scope of the representation agfreement cannot obviate
the lawyer's duty to provide competent representation.55 Therefore, although
competency depends somewhat on the scope and complexity of the representation,
limiting the representation does not remove the requirement of competent repre-
sentation.
The Model Rules provide a definition of informed consent: an "agreement by
a person56 to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated
adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably
available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct., 57 Further, the consent
must be obtained before representation is accepted.58 Precisely what must be
communicated to the client will generally vary according to the rule involved and
the circumstances giving rise to the need to obtain informed consent.59 In any
event, reasonable efforts must be made by the lawyer to ensure that the client
possesses information reasonably adequate to make an informed decision.6° This
will ordinarily include a disclosure stating the facts and circumstances giving rise
to the situation, any explanation reasonably necessary to inform the client or other
optimal in terms of dollars and cents, but that [my client] and I live up to our collaborative principles."
Id.
49. See supra note 33.
50. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2004).
51. See R. 1.1, 1.3.
52. See R. 1.1 cmt. [1].
53. R. 1.2(c).
54. Id.
55. R. 1.2 cmt. [6], [7]; see also Pa. Eth. Op., supra note 18, at 6.
56. The requirement that a "person" agree to the course of conduct illustrates another problem with
categorizing the family as a represented client; because a "family" as a concept is not in and of itself a
person, informed consent could, by definition, never be obtained. See supra note 38.
57. R. 1.0(e).
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person of the material advantages and disadvantages of the proposed course of
F, 62
conduct, and a discussion of the client's options and alternatives. In a written
collaborative law agreement delineating the scope of representation and the in-
formation and explanation necessary to obtained informed consent, consideration
should be given to the relative sophistication of the client. 63 The comments to the
rule suggest that a client's retaining independent counsel may also be a pertinent
factor weighing in favor of informed consent. 64
Informed consent has been labeled by some as a central ethical issue with re-
spect to the structure and ultimate goals of collaborative law arrangements.
65
State bar ethics opinions seem to take divergent views on the subject. 66 Pennsyl-
vania views the methods used by some collaborative practitioners to obtain in-
formed consent as problematic, in that it noted instances where clients and law-
yers did not appear to fully understand all of the implications of resolving the
dispute through collaborative law despite the fact that the attorney had received
67client consent. Kentucky takes a cautiously optimistic approach, indicating that
as long as clients fully appreciate the implications that collaborative law agree-
ments involve, such as the typical requirement of full and voluntary disclosure for
both parties, there is nothing to prevent them from agreeing to important distin-
guishing features of the collaborative process. 68 North Carolina, though it ac-
knowledges consent must be obtained, does not seem to anticipate that informed
consent will become a major ethical issue in collaborative law.6T
There is data that indicates that, in practice, collaborative lawyers do tend to
inform their clients of the central features of collaborative law, such as the dis-
qualification clause in the event the client decides to litigate, commitment to full
and voluntary disclosure, and commitment to the team approach of collaborative
law.7°
There are several main problem areas with informed consent. For one, the
terminology may be too abstract in the minds of clients, and sometimes inexperi-
enced practitioners do not anticipate and inform clients about all issues that may
arise during the process. 71 This, in turn, sometimes results in disappointment and
resentment on the part of the client.72 Client dissatisfaction aside, the disconnect
between expectations and results sometimes arising between the lawyer and client
may be indicative of inadequate explanation provided by the lawyer. One possi-
ble approach proposed by several commentators and cited with approval by the
61. Id.
62. Agreements limiting the scope of representation should preferably be in writing. R. 1.5(b).
Pennsylvania's rules of professional conduct do not have a provision stating that agreements of this
kind should be in writing, however the ethics opinion states that a written agreement is still preferable.
PA. RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(b) (2000); see Pa. Eth. Op., supra note 18, at 8.
63. See R. 1.0 cmt. [6].
64. Id.
65. MACFARLANE, supra note 1, at 64.
66. Compare Pa. Bar Eth. Op., supra note 8, at 7, with Ky. Bar. Eth. Op., supra note 24, at 4, and
N.C. Bar. Eth. Op., supra note 23, at 2.
67. See Pa. Eth. Op., supra note 18, at 7.
68. See Ky. Bar Eth. Op., supra note 24, at 4.
69. See N.C. Bar Eth. Op., supra note 23, at 2.





Roberson: Roberson: Let's Get Together
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2007
JOURNAL OF DISPUTE RESOLUTION
Pennsylvania state bar ethics opinion is "that lawyers take into account the indi-
vidual parties' capabilities, attitudes about professional services, and preferences
about risk when recommending a process to clients. 73 Essentially, the Pennsyl-
vania approach would be to promote a case-specific, "facts and circumstances"
method, both in terms of obtaining informed consent and in how those facts relate
to competent representation and agreements limiting the scope of representation.74
Such an approach may not only be more consistent with the ethical rules, but may
also help collaborative law continue its development as an increasingly viable
mechanism for resolving disputes, as overall client satisfaction arguably would
improve as a result of better communication between the lawyer and the client at
the beginning of the collaborative process.
E. The Disqualification Agreement
The disqualification agreement has been called the "irreducible minimum
condition" of collaborative law, as it provides a distinguishing characteristic from
other forms of alternative dispute resolution.75 As indicated above, the disqualifi-
cation agreement essentially is the subset of the collaborative law agreement that
disqualifies the lawyer from any further representation of the client if one or both
of the clients choose to withdraw and litigate the dispute. Because there are ethi-
cal rules restricting lawyers' ability to withdraw and the usage of retainer agree-
ments authorizing withdrawal, 76 disqualification agreements must be in compli-
ance with the Model Rules.
Rule 1.16 stipulates conditions for both mandatory and permissive with-77
drawal. Mandatory withdrawal must occur if representing the client would result
in some violation of the Model Rules or other law. 78 Permissive withdrawal may
occur if the lawyer can withdraw without having an adverse effect on the client's
interests, if the client has or is engaging in criminal or fraudulent behavior involv-
ing the lawyer's services, if the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement with the
client's decision on a course of action, if continued representation would result in
unreasonable financial hardship on the attorney, or if other good cause exists.79
The lawyer must also take steps to reasonably protect the client's interests upon
termination, and must comply with applicable rules of tribunals governing with-
drawal.8 °
Kentucky maintains the view that the ethical rules have been complied with if
the client has consented to an agreement limiting the objectives of representa-
tion.81 Since the terms of the lawyer's engagement are limited by the collabora-
tive law agreement, the lawyer is retained to assist the client with a particular,
73. Pa. Bar Eth. Op., supra note 18, at 7; see John Lande & Gregg Herman, Fitting the Forum to the
Family Fuss, Choosing Mediation, Collaborative Law, or Cooperative Law for Negotiating Divorce
Cases, 42 FAM. CT. REV. 280, 284-85 (2004).
74. See Pa. Bar Eth. Op., supra note 18, at 7.
75. See Lande & Herman, supra note 73, at 283.
76. MODEL RULEs OF PROF'L CoNDUCT R. 1.16 (2004); Lande, supra note 3, at 1344.
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specific objective: negotiating a settlement. 82 If a settlement cannot be reached in
the collaborative process, then the representation ends. 83 As long as the client has
been fully apprised of all the risks and rewards of the collaborative law process,
the Kentucky bar ethics committee sees nothing troubling about the disqualifica-
tion agreement. 84 North Carolina implicitly agrees with this view, finding that as
long as informed consent exists, the disqualification agreement is permissible. 85
Pennsylvania considers this to be a much more difficult issue to resolve.86 Its
ethics committee acknowledges that there is some validity to the view that if a
collaborative law case has gone beyond the written scope of representation, the
matter for which the lawyer was hired has naturally concluded and the lawyer
does not need to withdraw pursuant to Rule 1.16.87 On the other hand, the under-
lying divorce is not final, and because the lawyer has represented the client in
attempting to resolve the dispute but now intends through the withdrawal provi-
sion to stop representing that client, Pennsylvania finds merit in the argument that
the lawyer should comply with Rule 1.16. Since it finds the matter unresolved,
it advises that the more prudent approach is to follow Rule 1.16.89
Pennsylvania identifies Rule 1.16(c) and (d) at the outset, which must be
complied with if the lawyer withdraws from representation for any reason.9° Rule
1.16(c) requires judicial permission to withdraw if the collaborative lawyer has
filed an appearance for the client in court.9' Rule 1.16(d) requires the lawyer to
take reasonably practicable steps to protect the client's interest, including giving
reasonable notice, allowing sufficient time for other counsel to be employed, and
returning papers and property to which the client is entitled.92 Additionally, al-
though it appears that the mandatory withdrawal provisions in Rule 1.16 would
not be triggered in the collaborative law context,93 the permissive withdrawal
provisions found in Rule 1.16(b) could be applied in specific collaborative law
scenarios. 94 Since Rule 1. 16(b)(1) allows for lawyer withdrawal if it can be done
without material adverse effect on the interests of the client, withdrawal might be
allowed if done early in the representation, before too much time, money and
emotions are invested in the process. 95 If there is a material adverse effect on the
interests of the client that will result from withdrawal, the lawyer may still with-
draw if: (1) the client insisted upon taking action the lawyer considers repugnant
or with which the lawyer has a fundamental disagreement; (2) the client fails sub-
stantially to fulfill an obligation to the lawyer regarding the lawyer's services and
has been given reasonable warning that the lawyer will withdraw unless the obli-
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 7-8.
85. See N.C. Bar Eth. Op., supra note 23, at 1.
86. See Pa. Bar Eth. Op., supra note 18, at 11.
87. Id.; MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.16 (2004).
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gation is fulfilled; or (3) other good cause exists. 96 In all three situations as ap-
plied to collaborative law, Pennsylvania found some support for lawyers with-
drawing in certain contexts.97 For example, permitting lawyer withdrawal if the
client has failed to substantially fulfill an obligation to the lawyer would be ac-
ceptable assuming the client had violated a term of the collaborative law agree-
ment, but would not apply to situations where the other party failed to comply
with the agreement. 9 8 Pennsylvania also notes that there is significant disagree-
ment and ambiguity amongst commentators and courts as to whether "good
cause" or client insistence on acting in a manner with which the lawyer has a fun-
damental disagreement would include the rationale for the collaborative law with-
drawal provision, which is to provide the impetus for more meaningful negotia-
tion.99 It does seem clear, however, that a client's failure to comply with the terms
of the collaborative law agreement is a radically different situation than the other
party's failure to comply. Withdrawal for good cause might, in this scenario, be
the only justifiable way for the attorney to withdraw in circumstances where with-
drawal would cause material adverse effect on the lawyer's client.
III. CONCLUSION
Violation the Model Rules of Professional Conduct is certainly something all
practitioners are wary of, even in the traditional adversarial context where norms
of compliance with the Model Rules are clearly established. Collaborative law
practitioners should take extra caution, given the still-emerging norms of this spe-
cialty practice and the fact that many clients and practitioners are inexperienced in
anticipating all the consequences of where the collaborative law process will lead.
Outside of the state ethics opinions discussed in this comment, there is sparse
guidance from local authorities on how collaborative law is viewed within the
jurisdictions. Given the divergence in the few opinions that have been published,
it is conceivable that this divergence will continue to manifest itself until more
data about collaborative law becomes available and/or the American Bar Associa-
tion specifically addresses collaborative law within the Model Rules.
BRIAN ROBERSON
96. Id. There are additional scenarios for permissive withdrawal in Rule 1.16(b) that the Pennsyl-
vania opinion did not consider relevant for the collaborative law context. Id.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.; see Lawrence, supra note 13.
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